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AN ESSAY IN HONOR OF PAUL VERKUIL 
Arthur J. Jacobson∗
I first encountered Paul Verkuil in the late 1970s, when I started 
teaching administrative law.  I came across an article in the University 
of Chicago Law Review.1  It was a study of procedures for informal 
adjudication by administrative agencies.  Its author was a professor 
teaching law at North Carolina.  I remember it vividly.  (About how 
many articles you read over thirty years ago can that be said!)  It was 
everything I wanted my own work to be: passionate about the subject 
yet dispassionate about the results, simple yet unobvious, beautiful yet 
true.  I remember wondering, “Who is this guy?  He’s amazing!”  He 
was Paul. 
The next time I encountered him was close to twenty years later, 
when he became dean at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  
Administrative law, it turned out, did not last.  Paul did.  It was only 
after he stepped down from the deanship to become a beloved colleague 
that I learned where that article came from.  I was organizing a 
symposium on the legal theory of Baruch Spinoza.  Paul told me that his 
grandfather, Leendert, was a devoted reader of Spinoza.  He said that he 
had not so much studied Spinoza as he had inherited him from Leendert.  
He even wrote a moving recollection of that inheritance for my 
symposium.2  It was then that I understood who “this guy” really was.  
That passionate dispassion, unobvious simplicity, and beautiful truth of 
the article I had read in the late 1970s was the voice of Spinoza, refined 
and personified in Paul’s grandfather, and transmitted by him to Paul.  
What I was reading then in that article about procedures for informal 
adjudication was Spinoza, specifically Spinoza doing administrative 
law. 
 ∗  Max Freund Professor of Litigation & Advocacy, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 
Yeshiva University.  I would like to thank my assistant, Captain Erik Wilson of the United States 
Marine Corps, without whom this Essay could not have been written.  I would also like to thank 
Professor Eric Jensen for his discussions with Captain Wilson. 
 1 Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 
(1976). 
 2 Paul R. Verkuil, Recollections on Spinoza, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 667 (2003). 
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Nowhere are Paul’s Spinozist virtues more prominently on display 
than in his recent monograph, Outsourcing Sovereignty.3  In it, Paul 
unfurls a tight and elegant argument against the pathologies of the 
privatization movement in the federal government.  He dates the 
privatization movement to the Iran-Contra affair, which first came to 
light in 1986.  The significance of Iran-Contra, Paul suggests, is that 
certain members of the Reagan Administration decided to privatize 
foreign policy once Congress refused to finance the contras’ guerilla 
campaign against the Nicaraguan government.  But perhaps the origins 
of the privatization movement can be traced back even further than Iran-
Contra, to the deregulation that began during the Carter 
Administration—a steady contraction of the reach of government that 
began with deregulation and continued with privatization.4
Whatever the source of privatization, its consequences, Paul 
argues, have been clear.  Government has overreached in outsourcing 
government functions.  It has outsourced not only government functions 
that are amenable to outsourcing, but also those that are not: the 
“inherent” government functions.  Roughly speaking, those are the 
functions that require the exercise of judgment by public officials acting 
as agents of the sovereign.  The sovereign, Paul argues, is “We the 
People,” made sovereign by the Constitution of the United States.  
Functions amenable to outsourcing, in contrast, are those that do not 
require the exercise of sovereign judgment; they are functions that may 
be well-defined by contract and closely monitored by “Officers of the 
United States.”  The key to the distinction between government 
functions that are inherent and those that are not, in Paul’s vision, is 
accountability: the accountability of an agent to his principal, of 
“Officers of the United States” to “We the People.”  Government is thus 
accountable only when its officers exercise the judgment entrusted to 
them over inherent government functions, and having exercised that 
judgment, only when they ensure its implementation either through a 
bureaucracy subject to their command and control or through 
adequately defined and monitored contracts with private sources.  
Government has failed to be accountable over the past generation in 
both possible ways—impermissibly farming out the exercise of 
judgment, while failing to implement such judgments as have been 
properly made. 
 3 PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT 
FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2007). 
 4 One could go back even further.  Robert Timberg argues that the die for Iran-Contra was 
cast towards the end of the Vietnam War, when the men who were to become the authors of Iran-
Contra were officers serving in Vietnam.  ROBERT TIMBERG, THE NIGHTINGALE’S SONG 14 
(2006).  The lesson they learned from Vietnam, Timberg documents, was the betrayal of a 
military effort by a feckless political class.  Id. at 15.  They were not going to let that happen 
again. 
JACOBSON.32-6 6/26/2011  4:07:36 PM 
2011]     OUTSOURCING INCOMPETENCE  2327 
 
The unaccountability of government, in turn, has its own 
pernicious consequence concerning the competency of government.  
Officials who fail to exercise judgment over inherent government 
functions—or who neglect to inscribe that judgment either in adequately 
staffed and motivated bureaucracies or in suitably defined and 
monitored contracts—invite incompetence of many kinds, all of which 
have marked the era of privatization and all of which Paul documents.  
If officials will not do their jobs—if they will not exercise judgment 
over inherent government functions, or will not staff and motivate a 
bureaucracy, or will not define and monitor contracts with private 
sources—then either the job will not get done or it will get done badly.  
That is the lesson of Paul’s study. 
I want to take that lesson one step further.  I want to place the 
incompetence that is the product of privatization in a larger context.  I 
want to argue that the incompetence produced by privatization is 
inseparable from a broader crisis of state competence.  I want to say 
why there is a broader crisis, and why that crisis is unavoidable under 
present conditions. 
The poster boy for Paul’s argument about privatization must surely 
be Blackwater, one of the private security firms that, at the height of the 
Iraq war, provided “battlefield personnel for escorting convoys, 
protecting civilian leadership (e.g., Paul Bremer), and even 
interrogating prisoners.”5  Paul’s account of Blackwater focuses on the 
pathologies of privatization: 
In addition to conducting interrogations, assignments such as 
securing convoys or protecting Paul Bremer or even the Secretary of 
State often involve indirect or even direct combat confrontations.  
Indeed, sometimes contractors cause military actions even if they are 
not assigned to carry them out.  The four Blackwater employees who 
were dismembered and mutilated in Fallujah, where they ended up 
while guarding a convoy, is a grim reminder of how the military 
must react to contractor actions.  The Marines had to secure that city 
after that gruesome event, which was not in their plans beforehand.6
Paul’s conclusion about the Fallujah incident is ineluctable.  The 
Department of Defense, it appears, outsourced to Blackwater a task that 
it regarded as amenable to outsourcing, rather than as an inherent 
government function.  Were the Department of Defense to offer a 
justification of this decision, they would argue that providing security to 
a supply convoy is akin to an ordinary civilian security operation—like 
night watchmen at a construction site or armed guards accompanying an 
armored car—and is thus distinguishable from combat, which, as most 
today would probably agree, is an inherent government function.  But 
 5 VERKUIL, supra note 3, at 27. 
 6 Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted). 
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the reality of a theater in combat does not permit so fine a distinction to 
be drawn.  The Blackwater employees had necessarily to engage in 
combat, and their defeat drew the Marines into a combat operation they 
had neither desired nor planned.  Contracting with Blackwater to 
provide security for convoys thus wound up diverting the United States 
military from operations they had in fact planned, and calling into 
question the competence of a military that could so unwittingly be the 
cause of its own distraction. 
Paul’s Blackwater story is bad enough.  The real story is worse.  I 
asked Erik Wilson, a captain in the United States Marine Corps and a 
first-year law student at Cardozo, to look into the Fallujah incident a 
little more closely.  Here is what he found. 
The U.S. Army did not hire Blackwater directly.  The prime 
contract, part of the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP), was between the Army and Halliburton.  It was a contract 
to supply Camp Ridgeway, an Army base near Fallujah.  (See Figure 1.) 
 




Halliburton then subcontracted the supply contract to KBR, and 
KBR subcontracted it to ESS.  It was ESS that hired Blackwater to 
provide security for the convoys to Camp Ridgeway.  Four subcontracts 
connect, or separate, Blackwater from the ultimate recipient of its 
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services.  That looks like an awfully long chain of subcontracts.  But 
things were not so simple. 
Let’s start with the top of the chain.  It was actually KBR’s 
predecessor, Brown & Root, and not Halliburton, that had the first 
LOGCAP contract with the Army.  This was back in the 1990s, at the 
beginning of the LOGCAP program.  In 2002, Halliburton created KBR 
(merging two of its subsidiaries, Brown & Root and M.W. Kellogg), 
and replaced the former Brown & Root as the prime contractor.7  
Halliburton was thus the prime contractor at the beginning of the Iraq 
war in 2003.  The LOGCAP contract Halliburton signed at that point, 
known as LOGCAP III, was the second renegotiation of the initial 
LOGCAP contract between the Army and Brown & Root.8  
Halliburton’s role under LOGCAP III was only to guarantee KBR’s 
services, and the Army and other federal auditing agencies dealt directly 
with KBR, not with Halliburton.9  Halliburton was involved in 
LOGCAP III only because it owned KBR.  Thus, after Halliburton 
divested itself of KBR in 2007,10 KBR once again became the prime 
contractor in the LOGCAP IV contract, which is just now coming into 
effect. 
Now let us consider the bottom of the chain.  ESS did not hire 
Blackwater directly.  It hired Blackwater through a proxy company, 
Regency Hotel and Hospital Company of Kuwait.  What happened was 
this: Regency and Blackwater had submitted a joint proposal to replace 
ESS’s existing private security contractor, Control Risks Group.  Once 
Regency/Blackwater won the contract, they renegotiated it to make 
Regency ESS’s subcontractor and, in turn, make Blackwater Regency’s 
subcontractor.  Apparently Blackwater wanted this arrangement so it 
could get exclusive credit for the successful security operations.11
The presence of Regency in the chain is important because a 
dispute erupted between Blackwater and Regency about the armoring of 
the vehicles to be used in protecting the convoys.  According to Captain 
Wilson, Blackwater used its subcontractor status to “blackmail” 
Regency, saying that Regency now had to provide weapons, armor, and 
 7 Dana Hedgpeth, KBR Prepared to Sever Last Ties to Halliburton with Stock Swap, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 29, 2007, at D01. 
 8 Each LOGCAP contract has a maximum ten-year lifespan before it requires renegotiation. 
 9 See, e.g., Safeguarding Taxpayer Dollars in Iraq: An Insider’s View of Questionable 
Contracting Practices by KBR and the Pentagon: Hearing Before the S. Democratic Policy 
Comm., 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Charles Smith, former Chief of Army Field Support 
Command, Field Support Contracting Division) [hereinafter Safeguarding Taxpayer Dollars], 
available at http://dpc.senate.gov/hearings/hearing45/smith.pdf. 
 10 See Hedgpeth, supra note 7. 
 11 MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG., 
PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF BLACKWATER’S ACTIONS IN 
FALLUJAH 8 (2007) [hereinafter PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS], available at http://www.c-
span.org/pdf/blackwater100207.pdf. 
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other supplies, and that Blackwater would not supply them.  The 
apparent aim of this strategy was to get Regency either to pay for 
Blackwater’s supplies or default on their contract,12 which Blackwater 
would try to take over at an increased profit once Regency was no 
longer in the way.  Captain Wilson believes that Blackwater probably 
could not have gotten the security contract on its own and that it teamed 
with Regency for credibility, then tried to cut Regency out. 
Partially as a result of this dispute between Regency and 
Blackwater over equipment funding, the Blackwater team was 
extremely underequipped and underprepared for the March 31, 2004, 
mission in which four Blackwater employees died. 
I want to pause here in telling the story to make a comment.  
Outsourcing government tasks to a firm in the private economy subjects 
those tasks to the push and pull of the economy.  I do not have the 
illusion, and neither does Paul, that elements of the bureaucracy are 
without their own motivations and distortions, but when you sign up 
with the private economy, you agree to participate in the private 
economy’s motivations and distortions.  Let’s be blunt.  There was a 
dispute between Regency and Blackwater over who would pay to armor 
the security for the convoys.  That dispute led to the under-equipment 
and under-preparation of the security team on which the four 
Blackwater employees died.  Their deaths led the military to launch an 
invasion of Fallujah.  So here it is: A contract dispute led to a major 
development in a major war of the United States—and that is Paul’s 
point. 
Of course, similar disputes can and do produce similarly horrible 
results in the language of the bureaucracy, instead of the language of the 
market.  There is no doubt that the bureaucracy has its own version of 
contract disputes and its own version of letting hell to pay.  One cannot 
say, “oh, had the market not been involved, things would have turned 
out just fine: The four men on the supply mission would not have been 
killed and the United States would not have had to invade Fallujah.”  
That is not Paul’s argument, nor is it mine.  Nevertheless, the motive 
driving the decision-makers in the Blackwater incident was profit, 
rather than some other motive that we might attribute to the 
bureaucracy.  While profit is OK as a motive for screwing up in 
Fallujah, that is not the question.  The question is whether profit should 
be the guiding principal in directing our actions on a matter of state—on 
a matter of national interest.  If it were not economically efficient for 
the United States to survive, would Richard Posner support it? 
Now here is where the story gets particularly bad.  Captain Wilson 
found that the LOGCAP contract between Halliburton and the Army—
 12 See id. 
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LOGCAP III—provided that security for the convoys would be the 
responsibility of the Army.  The subcontract between Halliburton and 
KBR contained the same provision.  The LOGCAP III contract 
explicitly prohibited the use of weapons by any agents of the prime 
contractor or any of its subcontractors, and also had several clauses 
referencing two orders from United States Central Command 
(USCENTCOM) and two orders from the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) that similarly restricted the use of weapons by civilian 
contractors.13
In spite of these provisions and orders, ESS hired Blackwater to 
run security for them; KBR was aware of that fact, and it is unknown if 
Halliburton or the Army were aware.  Captain Wilson is of the opinion 
that if Halliburton or the Army were not aware, then it would have been 
due to deliberate ignorance.14  But it was not just ESS that was illegally 
hiring private security contractors; KBR itself hired at least three private 
security firms, and even privately armed some of its own employees.15  
Blackwater agreed to provide ESS with a thirty-four man security team 
that would establish a command center, have risk management 
expertise, and provide security personnel to protect installations and 
convoys.  In violation of this contract, the Blackwater team whose fate 
we are discussing was short of manpower and equipment—
communications equipment, ammunition, weapons, body armor and 
armored vehicles.  The convoy had not been risk-assessed, as was 
required by the contract between Blackwater and ESS.  This lack of 
risk-assessment resulted in Blackwater guiding the convoy through 
Fallujah, rather than the safer roads around it.  Blackwater also breached 
the contract by failing to provide six personnel to ride along with the 
convoy, sending only four instead.  They also failed to provide rear 
gunners for the security vehicles and were short on automatic weapons 
to protect the vehicles. 
The actual convoy ended up in the middle of Fallujah because of 
the lack of equipment and planning.  The convoy’s destination was 
Camp Ridgeway.  It was supposed to arrive on March 30, 2004.  
Because of the lack of planning, the convoy got lost and arrived at 
 13 Complaint at 6, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,  
No. 1:10-cv-00530 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter KBR Complaint], available at 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/03/31/KBR2.pdf. 
 14 PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 11, at 7; see also Memorandum from the 
Majority Staff to the Members of the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform  
(Feb. 7, 2007), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/ 
2007_hr/070207-memo.pdf; Jenny Mandel, Officials Admit Private Security Firm Was Hired 
Under Iraq Logistics Contract, GOVERNMENTEXECUTIVE.COM (Feb. 8, 2007), 
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0207/020807m1.htm. 
 15 KBR Complaint, supra note 13, at 6-8.  The Department of Justice is currently suing KBR 
for its failure and the failure of its subcontractors to abide by LOGCAP provisions that forbade 
the use of private security forces.  Id. 
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Camp Fallujah, a Marine Corps Base.  Once at Camp Fallujah, the 
Blackwater contractors located some KBR employees (since there were 
no ESS employees there), who told them how to get to Camp Ridgeway 
and warned them against going through Fallujah proper.  The convoy 
departed Camp Fallujah, but was promptly sent back by a U.S. Marine 
Corps checkpoint, for reasons unknown.  They spent the night at Camp 
Fallujah and departed for Camp Ridgeway in the morning.  The convoy 
deliberately circumvented the Marine Corps checkpoint, instead going 
through an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) checkpoint.  The trucks 
were ambushed and the Blackwater operators were killed.  There are 
conflicting reports as to whether the ICDC soldiers actually escorted the 
convoy into Fallujah and facilitated the ambush.16
The deaths of the Blackwater contractors created a national and 
international outcry.  There was an immediate call to invade and pacify 
the city of Fallujah.  The Marines, who controlled the ground forces 
around Fallujah under the ultimate supervision of the Army, requested 
that Fallujah not be invaded, saying that invasion would be 
counterproductive to the progress the Marines were making there.  
Local residents of Fallujah had voluntarily returned the bodies of the 
Blackwater contractors, and the Marines were confident they would 
have the perpetrators in custody within forty-eight hours.  Marine Corps 
Generals Mattis and Conway warned that attacking Fallujah at that time 
and in the manner suggested would cause the exact explosion in 
insurgency that in fact occurred after the invasion of Fallujah.  Their 
supervisor, Army General Ricardo Sanchez, nonetheless recommended 
the siege of Fallujah to the Secretary of Defense, who ordered the 
invasion to take place almost immediately.17
I tell this story at length to alert all of us, myself included, to the 
perils of remitting important matters of state either to the bureaucracy or 
to contract.  Both failed in Fallujah.  How could the Army not know that 
Blackwater was running security for the convoys going to Camp 
Ridgeway?  There is an answer to that question and it is not a happy 
one.  Captain Wilson found that there was a severe lack of Army 
oversight of the LOGCAP contract.18  The LOGCAP contract is an 
Army contract, so supervision began with the Army.  But responsibility 
for supervision continued up through the ranks of the Department of 
Defense, ultimately implicating at least half a dozen agencies within the 
Department, with overlapping responsibilities for ensuring the proper 
 16 PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 11. 
 17 Richard S. Lowry, A Short Excerpt from New Dawn, OP FOR (Mar. 14, 2010), http://op-
for.com/2010/03/a_short_excerpt_from_new_dawn.html. 
 18 See, e.g., INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REP. NO. D-2008-098, INTERNAL 
CONTROLS OVER PAYMENTS MADE IN IRAQ, KUWAIT AND EGYPT (2008) [hereinafter INTERNAL 
CONTROLS], available at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy08/08-098.pdf. 
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execution of contract provisions and appropriate documentation of 
contractor expenses.19  One would think that having all these agencies 
on the job would guarantee accountability.  But each of the agencies 
was seriously understaffed.  Today, for example, the Department of 
Defense has approximately 600 auditor vacancies.  There has been a 
direct correlation between the increase in contractor use and the 
decrease in federal regulators of their contracts.20  Even while the battle 
for Fallujah raged on due to the deaths of the Blackwater employees, the 
Department of Defense cut its contractor auditing staff by fifty percent.  
The senior supervisor for Army contracting at the time, a civilian 
federal employee named Charles M. Smith, had a staff of only two full-
time contracting personnel and a part-time lawyer to oversee $5 billion 
worth of contracts.21
So, did Fallujah teach us anything?  Sadly not.  The Army still 
does not track how many contractors are used to execute the LOGCAP 
contract, or how the subcontracts are specifically structured.22  Given 
this persistent failure of supervision, it is unsurprising that the Army 
either did not know that KBR and ESS were hiring security contractors, 
or simply failed to stop them.  But the lack of supervision was actually 
much broader in scope. 
A Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD-IG) report from 
200823 found that the Army’s failure to supervise contracts like 
LOGCAP resulted in $7.8 billion worth of improperly documented 
payments.  Of all the Army’s payments between 2001 and 2006, 73% 
failed to meet the Army’s own documentation standards.  For 
commercial contractors like KBR, 99.5% of the payments lacked 
sufficient documentation.24  The 2008 DOD-IG report is especially 
useful because it includes two years of peacetime payments as well, 
indicating that the Army’s accountability problems pre-date the war.25  
And if the Army cannot properly supervise its contracts in peacetime, 
there is essentially no hope in wartime. 
These problems of supervision are the result of a failure to set clear 
regulatory guidelines, employ and train personnel, and hold violators 
accountable.  Thus, only half of the Army’s contracting specialists—and 
only 2% of those on active duty—are adequately trained.  
 19 See, e.g., VALERIE BAILEY GRASSO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33834, DEFENSE 
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CONTRACTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12-15 
(2010) [hereinafter DEFENSE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CONTRACTS], available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33834.pdf. 
 20 See, e.g., id. 
 21 Safeguarding Taxpayer Dollars, supra note 9, at 2. 
 22 See, e.g., INTERNAL CONTROLS, supra note 18. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 4. 
 25 Id. 
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Accountability controls over contractor payments have never been 
finalized, there is still no formal training on LOGCAP contracts, and 
most of the personnel dealing with LOGCAP contractors have no 
LOGCAP experience at all.26
In theory, if the Army had had enough personnel to keep track of 
activities under the LOGCAP contract, it would have been possible to 
hold Blackwater and other subcontractors, running all the way up the 
chain to Halliburton, accountable for violating USCENTCOM and CPA 
orders and for breach of the LOGCAP contract.  The Department of 
Justice is currently suing KBR for fraudulently passing along 
Blackwater’s security costs to the Army without separately identifying 
them as security costs.27  The same evidence supporting this civil claim 
would also establish a violation of the Major Fraud Act of 1988 
(MFA),28 which makes it a felony for contractors or subcontractors to 
defraud the United States for amounts equal to or in excess of $1 
million dollars (Blackwater’s original contract with Regency was for 
over $11 million29).  The Department of Justice has the power to 
prosecute civilian contractors and subcontractors providing support to 
the Department of Defense for felonies committed in foreign countries 
under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA).30  
KBR, a qualifying subcontractor, could therefore have been prosecuted 
under federal law for the MFA violation as if the crime had been 
committed in the United States. 
However, lawsuits and criminal prosecutions offer only limited 
utility to theatre commanders: They are after-the-fact, take a long time, 
and have uncertain results.  Moreover, prosecution under MEJA comes 
with its own distinct set of problems: The Department of Justice does 
not have a MEJA division, and MEJA cases are referred back to local 
United States Attorneys’ Offices, which are already heavily backlogged.  
Of far greater utility are three summary powers the Army possesses that 
can remove offending contractors from the conflict area while 
deflecting the time- and resource-intensive process of litigation to 
federal court in the United States.  One method would have been simply 
to prohibit access to Army bases by problematic contractors.  This 
would quickly and effectively sever their ability to execute their 
contracts, and, most likely, their ability to stay in Iraq.  According to 
Captain Wilson, Army commanders favor this method because it 
efficiently avoids the burden of litigation under conditions of armed 
 26 See, e.g., id.; DEFENSE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CONTRACTS, supra note 19, at 11-15. 
 27 KBR Complaint, supra note 13. 
 28 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (2006). 
 29 Walter Pincus, U.S. Pays Steep Price for Private Security in Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 
2007, at A17. 
 30 18 U.S.C. § 3261. 
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conflict and limited resources.  The Army also had the power to exclude 
contractors from Iraq altogether.  Finally, the Army could have 
canceled, or threatened to cancel, any portion of the LOGCAP contract 
“tainted” by Blackwater. 
Of course, the Army declined to use any of its summary powers.  
Why was that?  Even if no relevant Army personnel knew about 
Blackwater’s operations prior to the ambush, they certainly knew about 
the operations afterwards.  But still, the Army took no decisive action to 
end Blackwater’s services or the use of private security contractors in 
violation of weapons regulations and the terms of the LOGCAP 
contract.  Why not?  The simplest answer is that the Army deemed these 
services necessary to the larger war effort—that it was simply unable or 
unwilling to fill the void that would have been left if Blackwater and 
other private security contractors like it were suddenly gone.  Likewise, 
according to this rationale, if the Army had known about the violations 
of USCENTCOM and CPA orders, and of the LOGCAP contract up 
and down the chain of subcontractors, it still would have taken no action 
for the very same reason. 
Consider the record.  Every moment in this sorry tale is marked by 
one species or another of incompetence.  It is, to be sure, incompetence 
owing to privatization.  But the incompetence is of broader reach than 
that.  It is incompetence of governance altogether, where the 
incompetence owing to privatization is a symptom, not a cause. 
We end where we began, in the company of Baruch Spinoza.  
Spinoza first proposed that sovereign is he who takes responsibility for 
the welfare of the subjects.31  He proposed this as a matter of fact, of 
stern realism in contrast with what he regarded as the idealism of 
Hobbes’s rather more chaste and withdrawn sovereign, who claims only 
to guarantee the peace.  Spinoza is the prophet of the welfare state, the 
state that lives or dies by the welfare of its subjects.  In such a state, 
every function imaginable is, at root, an inherent government function.  
There is no necessary distinction between public and private—or rather, 
the distinction between public and private is constantly being negotiated 
and redrawn.  What is private is private only for reasons of state and not 
for its own reasons.  We do not, in fact, have Hobbes’s state, a state that 
is responsible for keeping the peace and nothing else.  Spinoza was 
right.  Our state is Spinoza’s state.  It is a state that is subject to limitless 
demands.  Whether Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, Harry Truman’s 
Fair Deal, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, or George Bush’s 
Compassionate Conservatism—these are minor variations on a theme.  
The theme is that the state can never say no.  If there is a problem in the 
world, the state is responsible for fixing it.  The state is always being 
 31 See Arthur J. Jacobson, Law Without Authority: Sources of the Welfare State in Spinoza’s 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 681-85 (2003). 
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pressed to the limits of its competence, and all too often beyond.  At the 
same time, because the boundary between public and private is in 
constant negotiation, corruption and conflict of interest are baked into 
the core.  That is not the fault of those who rule us; it is their fate, and 
ours, which we must, as Spinoza told us, accept with grace. 
Years ago, I studied one way that the sovereign outsources 
judgment that has been enormously successful in many countries for 
close to two hundred years.  At its most elementary, this outsourcing 
takes the specific form of fiduciary obligation, in which one person, a 
fiduciary, exercises a judgment that legally binds another person, the 
beneficiary of the judgment.  Because the fiduciary’s judgment is a 
judgment that legally binds the beneficiary, it is necessarily a sovereign 
judgment, for it is only the judgment of the sovereign that can create or 
change another’s legally binding obligation.32  The fiduciary is 
necessarily the delegate of sovereign judgment. 
The legal system instantiates this initial delegation of sovereignty 
in a series of constructions based upon, and elaborating on, the fiduciary 
obligation.  The constructions range from agency and trust, to joint 
venture and partnership, to the corporation and the limited liability 
company.  Limited liability is the consummate expression of the 
delegation of sovereign judgment inasmuch as it replicates in the private 
sphere a partial sovereign immunity, which simultaneously shields both 
the managers of an enterprise and its investors from liability to outside 
parties.33
Fiduciary obligation and the myriad of associational structures 
built on it thus present a series of successful, and ancient, ways of 
outsourcing sovereignty.  Of course, each of these ways comes with its 
own set of problems and frustrations.  Each needs constant monitoring 
and adjustment.  But on the whole, these structures do the job the 
sovereign has assigned them to do: self-legislation in contract and the 
exercise of judgment on behalf of another in discharge of fiduciary 
obligation.  So the state can, in fact, outsource a certain kind of 
 32 What marks the sovereign as sovereign and distinguishes it from every other social 
institution is precisely the power to create and change legal obligation.  Of course, the sovereign, 
like any other social institution, can take on other tasks as well.  Nothing limits it to changing and 
creating legal obligation.  It can feed and it can clothe, it can educate, it can worship, build roads 
and pick up the trash.  But none of these other tasks is unique to sovereignty.  Only changing and 
creating legal obligation is. 
 33 On the delegation of sovereign judgment in general, see Arthur J. Jacobson, The Private 
Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the Common Law,  
29 BUFF. L. REV. 599 (1980) (rejecting the nexus of contracts account of the corporation in favor 
of a delegation account).  The question whether the institution of contract represents a delegation 
of sovereign judgment is controversial and difficult, and I shall not address it here.  I took the 
position in the Buffalo Law Review article that it does not, because the essence of sovereign 
judgment is creating or changing legal obligations for another, which contract cannot accomplish.  
Id. 
JACOBSON.32-6 6/26/2011  4:07:36 PM 
2011]     OUTSOURCING INCOMPETENCE  2337 
judgment, but only on a very strict condition: that the recipients of the 
power of judgment be subject to the discipline of the market.  That is 
what permits the outsourcing of judgment to succeed.  An outsourcing 
of judgment that simply puts a government function in private hands 
without subjecting it to a discipline of any sort—whether of politics or 
of the market or of bureaucratic coordination—cannot possibly succeed.  
The recipient of an undisciplined delegation of duty will use its powers 
at the expense of the public and for its own private good.  That is what 
happened in Fallujah. 
